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Legal Services and the Doha Round Dilemma 
Sydney M. CoNE III* 
This article examines the nexus between two international topics, namely, trade 
?egotiations, and regulation of the cross-border practice oflaw. Admittedly, this nexus 
18 not found at a conventional crossroads. Legal services lie somewhat at the periphery 
of international trade measured in terms of the global value of goods, services and 
Investment used to define major international economic relationships, or to define 
Pll.orities in the formulation of national and transnational economic policies. Moreover, 
~ade negotiators hardly figure among the principal regulators having responsibility for 
t e professional conduct of individuals and firms engaged in the practice of law. 
Notwithstanding the somewhat peripheral nature of legal services in the overall 
~alculation of balances of trade, and notwithstanding the traditional disjunction 
I etween responsibility for formulating trade policyl\flrr~J><W'J~iJ.i..ty for supervising 
ega! practitioners, the interaction of trade and legal ~m!:~s, f~ examined, can 
ProVide a useful analysis of its two components: of efforts to advance international trade 
;n legal services, and of proposals to develop rules Af·~d~t~~tate cross-border 
ega~ practice. Such an analysis can prove instructive for policf-Hf!dcers and interested 
P
1
afll.cipants not only in these two areas, but alswv· broader context of formulating 
g Oba} ' ~' rules governing trade and investment ge v\vHUUI . . 
. More particularly, this analysis can prove highly relevant to t!tre aspiranonal-
Pohtical dilemma, discussed in section I, that has marked the Doha Round of 
~Ultilateral trade negotiations. Indeed, as will be argued in section II, negotiations 
~VolVing international trade in legal services can provide an intriguing picture of the 
oha Round in microcosm. 
b As mentioned, the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part begins with the 
oha Round's aspirational-political dilemma, by which is meant the dilemma between 
PUrsuing the aspirations that were announced in 2001 as the Doha Round's hoped-for 
~enda, and accommodating political necessity in order to bring the negotiations to a 
s_uccessful" conclusion. Against the background thus provided, this part of the analysis 
~I describe efforts that have been made not only to include legal services in 
~nternational trade negotiations, but also to adapt local professional rules to the 
Urgeoning activities that constitute cross-border legal practice. 
d The second part of the analysis will de.al with certain consequences of the efforts 
escribed in the first part. These consequences will be investigated at the three levels of -----• C.V. Starr Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
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(1) trade policy, (2) the de jure regulation of legal practitioners offering their services 
outside their home countries, and (3) the de facto devolution of responsibility for policy~ 
making and regulatory enforcement upon private firms and individuals engaged 111 
cross-border legal practice. 
I. L EGAL SERVICES AND THE A SPIRATIONAL-POLITICAL DILEMMA 
The Doha Round has followed in the tradition of "rounds" of trade negotiatio~s 
that, initially, launched the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) an ' 
thereafter, took place from time to time during the half-century preceding the creauon 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO)-itself the result of negotiations durin~ a 
"round" of exceptional fecundity, the Uruguay Round. This history carnes 
consider~ble freight for the Doha Round. It is the fi~st "round" to take place aft~~ 
the creation of the WTO (and the first to take place 111 the twenty-first century). 
includes negotiations relating to new agreements-agreements on, for exarnp~e, 
services and investment- that were produced by the Uruguay Round.1 In addition,_ JtS 
mandate includes the politically charged task of assuring that the WTO as an institutJO~ 
is hospitable to the developing world, and that industrialized countries, as W'f 
Members, recognize the goals of other WTO Members seeking to benefit frorn the 
global economy.2 . 
The world's trade negotiators have found themselves threatened with dip]ornaoc 
stalemate in a number of key areas that have defined the aspirational character of the 
Doha Round's agenda. Thus threatened, the negotiators of necessity have looked for 
compromises that would appease the political forces serving local or regional int_eres;s 
which could not be persuaded of- indeed, in many cases, which were s1rnP y 
indifferent to-the virtues claimed for achieving substantial multilateral progress alonS 
the lines of the aspirational agenda. This threat of stalemate and the search for 
compromise have informed the increasingly poignant dilemma confronting the poh~ 
Round negotiations. The essence of the dilemma is whether the compromises require 
hi " ful" 1 · d I · b h I · of the to ac eve a success . cone us1on are so e etenous as to ro t e cone us1on 
aspirational qualities that provided the original momentum for undertaking these · 
negotiations. . f 
How has this dilemma affected negotiations with respect to legal services? A boe 
historical summary may be in order. Services, including legal services, first figured 1~ 
multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round, m: which a new Gene~ 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), patterned to a certain extent on the GA'l' ~ 
became one of the WTO Agreements.3 Unlike the GATT, however, which is statutO 
I See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 67 (Oxford University Press 2002). "D0 ]1a 
2 See World T rade Organiza tion Ministerial Declaration, 14 N ovember 2001 (hereinafter 
Development Agenda"). . n 15 
3 T he GATS is Annex lB to the Agreement Establishing the World T rade Organization as stgned 0 
April 1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco. 
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in character and creates rights and obligations relating to physical products, the GATS, 
dealing with services, constitutes a framework for the submission of commitments by 
the individual WTO Members, service-area by service-area.4 Therefore, to determine 
the commitments by Members of the WTO in the area oflegal services, it is necessary 
not only to understand the framework provided by the GATS itself, but also to do the 
following: (a) to look into the annexes to the GATS currently in effect; (b) there to 
consult the individual Schedules of Specific Commitments of each of the WTO 
Members; and (c) thereunder, to ascertain, member by member, whether any 
commitments were made as to legal services, and, if so, the exact nature of the 
commitments, including any pertinent reservations that given Members may have 
lodged. 
The outcome of the Doha Round in the area oflegal services will thus be found in 
the relevant specific commitments-or in the lack thereof, or in qualifications 
thereto-annexed to the GATS by the individual Members of the WTO. If the Doha 
Round dilemma pervades the GATS negotiations, either generally or in respect of 
~hose services that are especially susceptible to parochial or protectionist partisanship, it 
18 conceivable that the specific commitments set out for legal services will not so much 
illanifest the aspirations that were voiced at the outset of the Doha Round, as they will 
reflect concessions to local or regional political expediency deemed necessary to bring 
the negotiations to a conclusion, however distant that conclusion may be from a m<tior 
illultilateral mandate for trade in legal services. 
Against this background, the question arises, what has been going on that might 
~ace the negotiations on legal services within the ambit of the Doha Ro_und dilenuna? 
hree developments stand out: (a) the vigorous assertion of JUriSdiction over legal 
services by traditional regulatory authorities; (b) increasing recourse to the concept of 
the "foreign legal consultant"; and (c) the diversion of trade negotiations away from 
llluitilateral engagements administered by the WTO and into bilateral or regional 
arrangements. 
A.. THE TRADITIONAL REGULATORS O F LEGAL SERVICES 
A widespread phenomenon is the cautious attitude of traditional regulators 
~g~rding the implications _of the Doha Round in the area of legal services. In the 
V ~ted States, the Conference o( Chief Justices of State Courts has resolved that the 
11lted States Trade Representative (USTR) should "recognize and support the 
sovepjgnty of state justice systems and the enforcement and finality of state court ---se 4 Specific commitments and exemptions from mo;t-fuvoured-nation treatment relating to legal services are c;~ out under (1) Horizontal Conunitments and (2) Sector-Specific Commitments annexed as schedules to the • 
"p/S for the respecti.~e WTO . Members. The Sector-Specific Comtnitme~~ts for Legal Servtces are found under 
R..o ofesstonal Servtces , which 111 turn are found under "Busi ness Servtces , tn the relevant sch~dules. Untguay 
cl Und of Multilateral Trade N egotiations, Annex lb, vols 28-30 (Geneva: GATT Secretanat, 1994). The 
asstfical:lon of services is found in WTO Services Sectoral Classification List, Doc. MTN .GNSfW/120. 
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judgments". 5 (The reference to "state" is to the individual states of the United States.) 
This traditioniJ.list approach was reflected in a resolution adopted by the House of 
Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA) in August 2006, cautioning the 
USTR to be mindful of the essentially judicial nature of responsibility for overseeing 
the practice of law.6 The USTR, in fashioning US commitments on legal services 
under the GATS, thus may show considerable deference to the views oflocal regulators 
oflegal services in the US states. 
In not dissimilar fashion in the European Union (EU), it has become clear that EV 
commitments in respect oflegal services under the GATS will leave broad discretion to 
the individual EU Member States to reserve to themselves the regulation of legal 
practice within their national territories by individuals and firms that do not qualify as 
EU legal practitioners. Although the EU has adopted Directives that encourage cross-
border legal practice within the EU, these Directives are applicable only to cross-border 
practice by EU nationals within the EU.7 Accordingly, an EU Member State that wants 
to protect its legal practitioners from competition from outside the EU will be in a 
position to shape EU commitments on legal services under the GATS so that the 
commitments are conditioned on reservations deemed to serve the interests of that EV 
Member State. This possibility is more than theoretical, for a number of examples exist 
of resort to such reservations.s 
Worldwide, there probably exists considerable political interplay and affinitY 
between the local regulators oflegal practice and the local practitioners. To the extent 
that the latter seek protection from foreign competition, they may have the political 
means to influence the regulators to provide that protection. If the local practitioners 
are divided in their views on cross-border legal practice, or if many of them are 
indifferent to the subject, or if users of legal services seek access to cross-border legal 
practitioners and exert political pressure to obtain that access, then the regulators maY 
be under competing pressures, which could translate into less political pressure to adopt 
protectionist measures. Even in this situation, however, the regulators may be jealous of 
their traditional prerogatives as rule-makers for the legal profession, and, simply as a 
matter of preserving their authority over the practice of law, they may resist perceived 
5 Resolution 26, Conference of C hief Justices, adopted as proposed by the International Agreements 
Committee on 29 July 2004. . . 1 6 R eport to the ABA House of Delegates on the Legal Services portion of the GATS, August 2006, availab e 
at http://www.abanet.org/intlawfpolicyftradecustoms/gats0806.pdf (last accessed 23 January 2007) . See als~ 
R esolution 5, Conference of C hief Justices, adopted as proposed by the CCJ International Agreernen\ 
Committee on 2 August 2006: "Whereas, the recommended solution as now worded supports the United State 
Trade R epresentative's participation in the development of clisciplines that "do not rmreaso11ably" impinge upon the 
authority of the states' highest courtS of appellate juriscliction to regulate the legal profession in the United States· ·d 
N ow, therefore, be it resolved that cl1e Conference urges the ABA House of Delegates to strike the wor 
'unreasonably' before acdng upon the resolution" (emphasis in original). 
7 This results from the definition oflawyer in Article 1.2(a) of the EU Directive as one who is "a national of a 
Member tate". f/ 
8 See Draft EU Doha Round O ffer on Legal Services (draft of February 6, 2003), available at http' 
www.gatswatch.org/docs/offreqfEUofferfE U-draftoffer- l .pdf (last accessed 24 January 2007). 
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Incursions into their domain that would arise by virtue of specific commitments under 
the GATS. 
Beginning in the 1980s, Japan has undergone an interesting process in which 
Conflicting political pressures have brought about an evolving approach to the domestic 
regulation of foreign lawyers and law firms, coupled with evolving attitudes toward the 
treatment of legal services in trade negotiations. This evolution has seen Japan 
ca_utiously become less protective of its legal practitioners. Perceptibly, although not 
Without hesitation, Japan has been able to moderate or intermediate between local 
Political interests, and to factor into legal-service negotiations its paramount national 
Interest in establishing good relations with countries that are its partners in international 
trade in areas that count for far more than legal services in terms of economic activity 
and achieving high levels of overseas investment and net exports. As a result, Japan has 
adopted both domestic measures and transnational positions in trade negotiations that, 
gradually, have proved more accommodating to the presence in Japan of lawyers and 
firms from abroad engaging in cross-border practice. 9 This history of careful and 
deliberate accommodation suggests that, in the Doha Round, past Japanese 
c0 rnm.itments will be retained, and changes that took effect on 1 April 2005 will be 
ll}c!uded. They permit (1) non-Japanese lawyers registered in Japan to employ Japanese 
~\Vyers , and (2) partnerships between individual Japanese lawyers and non-Japanese 
\Vyers registered in Japan.10 
A recent and, for the moment, seemingly unambiguous illustration of the 
Protectionist phenomenon has arisen in China. There, in April 2006, the Shanghai 
lawyers Association, with the apparent backing of the Chinese Ministry of Justice and 
~ ""al . th . 111UruCip government of Shanghai, issued a memorandum assertmg at certam 
American and British law £inns use their offices in Shanghai (and, by implication, 
elsewhere in China) to violate regulations prohibiting foreign law £inns in China from 
Practising Chinese law. 11 Apparently, in the past, these regulations had not been strictly 
enforced, and a policy of toleration had prevailed under which the Chinese office of a 
foreign law firm could hire or associate itself with local lawyers and, by integrating tl1e 
~ork of these local lawyers into its own work, effectively provide legal services 
Involving Chinese law. The position taken by the Shanghai Lawyers' Association 
suggests that this policy of toleration may be coming to an end, and that foreign law 
firms in China may face official sanctions, even expulsion fro!ll China, if they are 
JUdged to have engaged in illegal.activities by failing to confine their practice to non-
Chinese law. 
----9 See Takeo Kosllgi , Regulatio11 of Practice by Foreig11 LA111yers, 27 Am. J. Comp. L. 678 (1979). 10 See PricewaterhouseCoopers Newsletter, Japan (13 April 2005). 
Ma 11 See : ·shan~hai Bar Association Upset With Practices of Foreign Fim1s," N ew York Law Journal at 1 (17 
Sn Y 2006) (md1catmg that these assertions are outlined in a " fiery" 17 April 2006 memorandum released by the 
. angha, Lawyers Association) . 
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The tenor of the April 2006 memorandum issued by the Shanghai Lawyers' 
Association leaves little doubt as to its protectionist motivation. It calls on 
governmental authorities to take action against foreign law firms to "put in order, 
regularize and purify the Shanghai foreign legal services market" .12 This language rather 
clearly conveys the objective of reserving to "pure" Chinese law firms certain areas of 
legal work being handled in part by law firms that have offices in China but are based in 
the United States or the United Kingdom. China may be a recent country to provide 
an example of anti-competitive domestic reaction against cross-border practice, but it is 
hardly the first or only country in which local practitioners have expressed sentiments 
of an anti-competitive character and, expressing those sentiments, have sought to have 
their governmental authorities rein in the foreign competitors. Indeed, a study of the 
regulation of foreign lawyers in many countries all over the world reveals comparable 
reactions by local legal practitioners and, at their behest, local governments. 13 The rules 
governing foreign lawyers in jurisdictions in (for example) Europe, North America, 
Latin America and Asia have historically been rife with protectionism and, today, are far 
from free of protectionist restrictions. 14 (As will be seen in the next section, the 
introduction of the relatively permissive licensing of "foreign legal consultants" has 
itself not been free of protectionist restrictions.) 
The reason for focusing on China is not that that country is uniquely protectionist, 
but that its legal practitioners have given expression to their concerns in an era in which 
those concerns can be seen as part of a reaction against "globalization" .15 Here, the term 
is commonly used to signify exploitation of the developing world by economic interests 
in industrialized nations. Thus, because China has yet to become a significant base for 
its own global law finns, it can, for present purposes, describe itself as part of the 
developing world-as a country that is barely beginning to develop law firms capable of 
engaging in cross-border practice of global dimensions. The reaction by local Chinese 
law firms against "globalization" becomes almost generic when the foreign law firms 
being scrutinized are said to be American and British, that is, firms from industrial 
nations closely identified with activities in which home-country enterprises extend 
their operations abroad into a variety of host-country settings. 
A generic reaction to "globalization" may not be a rational approach for China to 
take to further its global economic ambitions, however. First, not unlike Japan (as 
discussed above), China has major trading and investment interests that, in general 
d
,, 
economic tenns, may well outweigh the potential benefits of protecting a "purifie 
Chinese legal profession. 16 In all likelihood, those interests might be best served by 
giving the users of legal services in China appropriate access to the experience and 
12 !d. 
13 See Sydney M . Cone, lll , lntem ational Trade in Legal Services: R egulation of Lawyers and Finns in 
Global Practice§ 1.3.3 (Litde, Brown 1996) (hereinafter "Trade in Legal Services"]. 
14 See Trade in Legal Services, C h. 1. 
IS See The Economist, "The Future of Globaliza tion ," (29 July 2006). 
16 See John Edwards, "W e Must Prepare for d1e March of China's Giants ," Financial Times at 1 f (17 JanuarY 
2007). 
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expertise of cross-border law firms which can help advance China's business, 
corrunercial and financial undertakings. The balance to be struck is the conventional 
Political one between protecting the local legal profession against foreign competition, 
and ensuring that national consumers of legal services will have the support of legal 
Practice of the highest quality, be it domestic, foreign or a blend of the two. 
A second reason why a generic reaction to "globalization" may not be a rational 
approach for China to take relates to the practice of law itself and its relevance to 
China's role in the world. Here, China might well take account not only of the interests 
of its consumers oflegal services (as just discussed), but also of the role that Shanghai or 
Beijing (for example) might play as an international center for legal practice. Obsession 
~Ith the nationality or ethnicity of the individuals who control the law firms established 
10 a given location may not contribute constructively to its development as an 
International legal center. On the contrary, giving "purist" priority to national and 
ethnic concerns may simply serve to stifle competition and such healthy concomitants 
of competition as the introduction of new and creative ways of handling substantive 
legal problems, the training of young lawyers with the aid of current developments in 
legal education, the use by law offices of advanced information technology, and the 
adoption of state-of-the-art methods for managing a legal practice. 
The record to date suggests that Chinese legal practitioners should be quite equal 
to dealing with the presence of cross-border competition in China, and that they will 
learn from and develop entrepreneurial skills assuring benefits from this competition. 
Chinese law students and lawyers are already impressively present on the international 
scene. 17 The result to fear is not that Chinese lawyers will prove to be slow learners 
and incapable of adapting to the modern world of cross-border legal practice. Rather, 
the result to fear is that, once in the grasp of protectionist policies, the Chinese legal 
Profession, as well as the regulators of legal practice in China, will be unable to free 
themselves from dependency on protectionism, and, thus enthralled, will fail to 
~Oster, indeed, will frustrate, the development of international centers oflegal practice 
In China. Unhappily, it may turn out that the early adoption of protectionist policies 
Will lead to indefinite dependency on them, and that the general benefits to China of 
attracting major centers of international practice will be needlessly diminished. 
China is far from alone in facing protectionist temptations and debilitations. As 
mentioned above, there are states in the United States and EU Member States that seek 
to qualify commitments on legal services in the Doha Round in order to maintain 
measures adopted for the protection of their local legal professions. The prospects for 
multilateral progress thus seem rather limited. A common explanation is the local 
Political power of regulators who find in protectionism an instrument both for 
Preserving their own local jurisdictional dominions and for catering to their respective 
regulated constituencies. 
---17 See "Why China," Pro£ William P. Alford, Harvard Law Bulletin, Sununer 2006. 
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This protectionist picture has been moderated by measures taken in some 
international legal centers to facilitate cross-border practice. In London, it is often 
possible for a qualified foreign lawyer to "requalify" as an English solicitor on the basis 
of certain studies followed by an examination. 18 In N ew York, admission to take the 
bar examination is often available after 20 semester hours of study in a US law school; 
success on this examination can provide access to full-fledged membership of the New 
York bar. Also in N ew York, a foreign lawyer who does not take the bar examination 
may be eligible for being licensed, without examination, as a legal consultant. Subject to 
limitations on scope of practice, the legal consultant in New York is entitled to many of 
the privileges available to full-fledged members of the New York bar.19 
B. INCREASING RECOURSE TO THE CONCEPT OF THE "FOREIGN LEGAL CONSULTANT" 
The profession of legal consultant (mentioned in the preceding paragraph) was 
created by the state of New York in June 1974, when the state's highest court (the 
Court of Appeals) adopted rules expressly for this purpose. These rules had just been 
authorized by a specific enabling statute adopted by the state legislature and signed by 
the governor.20 In turn, the rules authorized the state's intermediate courts (the four 
Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court), in their "discretion," to license as legal 
consultants, without examination, lawyers who were in good standing in foreign 
jurisdictions, who met certain criteria as to age and length of practice, and whose 
"character and fitness" were comparable to the same qualities required of members of 
the bar. Thus, New York came to have two parallel legal professions: the lawyer who is 
a member of the bar (called an "attorney and counsellor-at-law"); and, as from June 
1974, the "legal consultant"-who, under the applicable rules, "shall be considered a 
lawyer affiliated with the [New York] bar'' . Members of the two professions are entitled 
to work together in the same law office, and to employ or be employed by members of 
the other profession. The purpose of authorizing the second profession of legal 
consultant, as reflected in the legislative history of the enabling statute, is to facilitate the 
establishment in New York of individuals and firms engaged in cross-border legal 
practice, and thereby to promote New York as an international legal center 
contributing to the state's economy. 
In acting as just described, New York did not invent the concept or title of "legal 
consultant". In point of fact, New York deliberately drew its inspiration from a legal 
profession then existing in France, that of conseil juridique, and the term "legal 
ts See Trade in Legal Services § 7.5. , 
19 Parts 520 and 521 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of New York (Admission of Attorneys and 
Counselors at Law; Licensing of Legal Consultants). See also Trade in Legal Services, Ch. 3. 
20 Part 521 of the Rules of th.e Court of Appeals of New York (Licensing of Legal Consultants). The New 
York State Legislature passed an enabling sta tute authorizing the New York Court of Appeals to adopt "rules for 
the licensing, as a legal consultant, without examination and without regard to citizenship, of a person admi tted to 
practice in a foreign country as an attorney or counselor or the equivalent." New York Judiciary Law § 53(6) 
(1974). See Trade in Legal Services, Ch. 3. 
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consultant" was borrowed from-was a conscious approximation of-the French 
title. 21 In France at that time, the legal professions included those of conseil juridique and 
avocat, and, generally speaking, the parallel professions that came to exist in New York 
in 197 4 were similar to those two professions as they then existed in France. There was 
this distinction, however: at the time in France, foreign (non-French) nationals, 
otherwise qualified, could become conseils juridiques but could not become avocats. As 
what may now be seen as a development of historic irony from the perspective of the 
ongoing New York profession oflegal consultant, the profession of conseiljuridique was 
merged into that of avocat in France in 1991, and no longer exists in France as a separate 
profession. Also, the profession of avocat has become accessible to non-EU nationals 
who can pass a French bar exarnination.22 Thus, unlike New York, where a qualified 
candidate can be licensed as a legal consultant without examination, a similar route to 
legal practice has ceased to be available to non-EU lawyers in France. 
In August 1993, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (ABA), 
acting on a report by the ABA Section of International Law and Practice, decided to 
encourage all of the US states to adopt rules for the licensing of legal consultants. By 
then, several states had adopted rules that, in varying degrees , resembled N ew York's 
rules, although the variations often contained protectionist alterations.23 Eschewing the 
21 See Sydney M. Cone IT!, Foreign Lawyers in France and New York, 9 Int'l Lawyer 465 (1975). 
22 See Trade in Legal Services, Ch. 9. 
23 Five examples are as follows: 
S In California, a "registered foreign legal consultant" may not " render professional legal advice on the law of the 
. tate of California, any other state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the United States, or of any 
Junsdiction other than the jurisdiction named in satisfying the requirements of (c) of this rule, whether rendered 
InCident to preparation oflegal instruments or otherwise." Rule 9.44, California Rules of Court (an1ended 1 January 
2007) , available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.govfrulesfdocumentsfpd£Filesftitle_9.pdf (last accessed 23 January 2007). 
F . In Florida, "foreign legal consultants" may not "render professional legal advice on the law of the State of 
londa, tl1e United States, or any other state, subdivision, commonwealth, or territory of the United States, or the 
D,stnct of Columbia (whether rendered incident to the preparation of a legal instrument or otherwise)". Rule 16-
~- 3 , Rules R egulating the Florida Bar, available at http://www.floridabar.org/divexe/rrtfb.nsf/FV/ 
I'SBC652D4B17E0185256BC0006D1A12 (last accessed 23 January 2007). 
In Illinois, "foreign legal consultants" may not "render professional legal advice on or under the law of tl1e 
State of Illinois or of tl1e United States or of any state, territory or possession thereof or of d1e District of Columbia 
or of any other jurisdiction (domestic or foreign) in which such person is not authorized to practice law (whether 
Rndered incident to the preparation of legal instruments or otherwise)". Rule 712 ofd1e Illinois Supreme Court 
A. ules on Admission and Discipline of Attorneys, available at http://www.state.il .us/court/SupremeCourtfRules/ 
rt_ VllfartVII.htm#Rule712 (last accessed January 23, 2007). 
In Pennsylvania, " foreign legal consultants" may not "render professional legal advice on the law of 
[Pennsylvania] , of any other jurisdiction in which he or she is not authorized to practice law or of the United States of 
Amenca (whemer rendered incident to me preparation of legal instruments or od1erwise)(.]" Chapter 71, 
Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules, Rule 341: Foreign Legal Consultants, available at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/ 
0 PPostinglsupremefoutf361spct.lattach.pdf (last accessed January 23, 2007). In Pennsylvania, an applicant may be 
~ensed to practice in d1e state as a foreign legal consultant, without examination, if, inter alia, the applicant passes the 
ulnstate Professional Responsibility Exam[ination] with a score required by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 
See Rule 341(a)(6), Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules, Foreign Legal Consultants. 
. In Texas, "foreign legal consultants" may render "professional legal advice on the law of Texas or of the 
~lUted States of America (whether rendered incident to the preparation oflegal instruments or otherwise) ... on 
t e basis of advice from a person duly qualified and entitled (otherwise than by virtue ofhaving been certified under 
t!Us Rule) to render professional legal advice in Texas on such law and with whom d1e Foreign Legal Consultant i) 
Is co-counsel with a Texas lawyer that has been identified to d1e client, or u) has an identified affiliation, 
employment, partnership, shareholder or oilier membership relationship in or with (A) the same law finn, (B) a 
company partnership, or other entity, or (C) a governmental agency or unit ... ", available at http:f/ 
WWw.ble.state.tx.usfRules/NewRulesfrulexiv.htm (last accessed 24 January 2007). 
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protectionist alterations that had arisen in other states, the ABA House of Delegates 
adopted a Model Rule that was substantially identical to New York's rules .24 Like NeW 
York, the ABA in 1993 used the term "legal consultant". Even so, the practice has long 
become widespread of using the term " foreign legal consultant" and the acronym 
"FLC"-and these (foreign legal consultant and FLC) constitute today's conventional 
nomenclature for referring to the title, and the rules creating the title, under which a 
lawyer from a foreign home country may be authorized to practice in a host country 
without having to become a full-fledged member of an historically established legal 
profession in the host country. The omission of the word " foreign" in the N ew York 
and 1993 ABA title of "legal consultant" was more than cosmetic, however. It had the 
deliberate policy objective of signifying that, once licensed, the "legal consultant" was a 
local lawyer entitled to be recognized as such. In varying degrees, this policy may or 
may not be reflected in jurisdictions or commentaries that use the appellation of FLC. 
To date, wherever it exists, the profession of "legal consultant" or "foreign legal 
consultant" (the "consultant") does not enjoy the right to conduct a legal practice 
having as broad a scope as that of an historically established legal profession in the host 
jurisdiction. The consultant may be licensed locally, but the license has a non-local 
connotation, and the licensing jurisdiction invariably clings to a territorial tradition 
when it comes to granting the privileges of full-fledged rights of legal practice. OnlY 
lawyers who are conventionally tied to the territory in question are granted the entirety 
of those privileges. Thus, in New York, the legal consultant, as such, has no rights of 
appearance for the purpose of representing clients before the courts, and is not 
authorized to engage in certain areas of practice that traditional practitioners have been 
able to preserve for themselves in respect of real property, decedents' estates, and marital 
or parental relations-areas of practice that traditional practitioners have persuaded the 
local regulators to treat as being rooted in the territory of the licensing jurisdiction. 25 
In essence, then, the consultant is licensed to conduct a practice that comprises the 
giving of legal advice, the negotiation and preparation of transactional documentation, 
and the provision of assistance to other legal practitioners. Here, the critical question 
that arises is, may the consultant carry out these activities when they involve local law, 
or does the territorial bias also pervade the consultant's permitted domain of practice? 
What, that is, are the rights of practice of the consultant in respect of the law of the host 
jurisdiction, commonly called host-country law? Both New York and the ABA Model 
Rule dealt with this critical question by authorizing the consultant to render 
professional legal advice on US state or federal law, whether rendered in connection 
with the preparation oflegal instruments or otherwise, but only if the advice is rendered 
"on the basis of' advice from a practitioner who is not a consultant and who, in the 
24 See ABA "Model Rule for the Licensing of Legal Consultants," August 1993. See also T rade in Legal 
Services Appendix 11-A. 
2S See§ 521.3 o f the Rules of the Court o f Appeals of N ew York (Licensing of Legal Consu ltants). 
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JUrisdiction in question, is "duly qualified and entitled" to render professional legal 
advice.26 
The "on the basis of' formulation is a political compromise negotiated in 1973-
197 4 in New York between proponents of an unqualified right to advise on local law 
Patterned after the then French model of conseil Juridique (as explained above), and 
proponents of a territorial approach that would have simply prevented the licensed 
c.onsultant from giving any advice whatever on host-country law. With the passage of 
tlrne, this formulation has proved quite permissive in New York, but has encountered 
territorial-based opposition in many jurisdictions other than New York. It has proved 
Permissive in New York because licensed consultants have been given discretion to 
JUdge for themselves when they have an adequate "basis" for giving advice on local law. 
Also, where a firm includes both a licensed consultant and a member of the New York 
bar in its New York office, the consultant may have readily at hand a "basis" for 
advising on local law.27 As mentioned, however, this permissive approach has not 
found favor in the many jurisdictions in which a consultant may be licensed to advise 
on the consultant's home-country law, but is prohibited from advising on host-country 
law. 
The prohibition forbidding consultants to advise on host-country law while in the 
host country has been overwhelmingly adopted in those jurisdictions that license 
consultants. The prohibition is, however, little more than an assertion of territorial 
Power that is difficult to defend in terms of the realities of global legal practice. Whether 
a French avocat in Paris or a Japanese bengoshi in Tokyo is authorized to advise on 
Pennsylvania law is not a question of Pennsylvania law but a question of the law of, 
respectively, France or Japan. So long as each of those two lawyers is advising clients in 
the lawyer's home country, the lawyer may be entitled to advise on the law of 
Pennsylvania irrespective of the scope of practice that Pennsylvania permits a consultant 
licensed and practicing in that state. While physically present in, respectively, France or 
Japan, each of those two lawyers looks to home-country law to determine whether the 
lawyer is entitled to advise on the law of Pennsylvania. (The converse is true as well: 
Whether or not a Pennsylvania lawyer practising in Pennsylvania is entitled to advise on, 
say, French or Japanese law, is a question of Pennsylvania law.) In contrast, under the 
~es in force in Pennsylvania, although a French avocat or a Japanese bengoshi, to be 
licensed as a consultant, must first pass a US examination on legal ethics, that lawyer, 
once licensed and practicing as a consultant in Pennsylvania, is prohibited from 
tendering legal advice on US state or federallaw.28 ---A. 26 Section 521.3, supra note 25, ABA Model Rule for the Licensing of Foreign Legal Consultants, revised 
ti~st 2006. The revised rule used the phrase '.'Foreign Legal Consultant" in place of "Legal Consultant" in the 
1 e and text, m addioon to making other nunor substanove alterations. Available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
~adership/2006/annualfdailyjournalfthreehundredonea.doc (last accessed January 23, 2007). See also Carole Silver, 
egulatit~g lt~temational Lawyers: The Legal CottSultant Rules, 27 Houston J. Int'l L. 527 (2005). 
27 See Trade in Legal Services § 3.3.2.3. 
RIa 28 204 Pa. Code Chs. 71 and 83, Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules and Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement 
e tl.ng to Foreign Legal Consultants. 
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In adopting its Model Rule for the licensing of consultants, the ABA had before it 
a report that argued against adopting a territorial approach to the issue of whether the 
consultant should be permitted to render advice on host-country law. The report 
asserted that lawyers advise on transactions and disputes, "not on laws in the abstract"; 
that the lawyer is expected to blend relevant national laws into a "seamless web"; and 
that rendering legal advice is "an inherently synthetic process" whenever the laws of 
two or more jurisdictions, including host-country law, are involved. 29 In addition, the 
report pointed out that, to be licensed as a consultant under the Model Rule, a foreign 
lawyer must comply with host-state rules of professional conduct that in all cases 
prohibit the giving of legal advice outside a lawyer's area of professional competence. 
The report also alluded to the " powerful" deterrent effect of "considerations of 
professional liability". These statements in the report have not proved to be widelY 
persuasive, however. Although the report presumably influenced the approach taken by 
the Model Rule, it has tailed to convince a large number oflocal authorities in US states 
to adopt the critical provision of the Model Rule intended to permit a licensed 
consultant to advise on local law "on the basis of' advice from a traditional local lawyer. 
Notwithstanding the 1993 report and Model Rule, the territorial approach remainS 
very much alive. 
The persistence of the territorial approach is manifest not only within but also 
outside the United States. Examples are the two other parties to the North AmericaP 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)- Canada and Mexico. Although there is a NAFTJ\ 
model rule on foreign legal consultants, it leaves to the host jurisdiction the question of 
whether a consultant may advise on the law of that jurisdiction. 3D It appears that, to 
date, no jurisdiction in Canada or Mexico has abandoned the territorial approach under 
which foreign lawyers are not authorized to practice host-jurisdiction law unless theY 
become members of a traditional legal profession in the host jurisdiction. The provinces 
of Canada have rules for the licensing of foreign (meaning non-Canadian) legal 
consultants, but those rules do not seem to permit the licensed consultants to advise on 
Canadian provincial or federal law.31 An additional restriction in Mexico limits the 
ownership interests of FLCs in a law office in Mexico. 32 
At the beginning of the Doha Round, two New York bar associations and a OS 
service-industries coalition submitted to the USTR a draft of"reference paper" on legal 
services, which drew its inspiration in part from the provision in the ABA Model Rule 
(based on the precedental provision in New York's rules on legal consultants) that 
permits a consultant to advise on host-country law if the advice is given "on the basis 
29 See Trade in Legal Services, Appendix II-B. 
30 See Trade in Legal Services § 6.5 .3. 
31 See, e.g., By-Law 39, Foreign Legal Consulrants, Law Society of Upper Canada, available at http:// 
www.lsuc.on.cafregulationfafby-lawsfbylaw39/ (last accessed Jan uary 24, 2007). See also Trade in Legal Services. 
Ch. 5. 
32 See Trade in Legal Services § 6.5 .3. 
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of' advice by a traditional host-country lawyer. 33 The idea behind this proposed 
reference paper was rather ambitious; it was to serve as a medium for the submission of 
specific commitments on legal services under the GATS. Simply by making express 
reference to the reference paper, a WTO Member could incorporate the reference 
Paper's provisions into that Member's commitments in respect of legal services . The 
Provisions of the reference paper call for a number of specific commitments, including 
the following: 
reasonable and transparent rules pennitting foreign lawyers and law firms to 
obtain and exercise rights of establishment in a host country; 
the right of foreign lawyers and law firms established in a host country to 
render the range oflegal services that they are entitled to render in their home 
countries, subject to the requirement that, where appropriate, the services be 
based on services rendered by traditional host-country lawyers; 
the right of foreign lawyers to hire and be hired by local lawyers, to associate 
with local lawyers in the host-country office of a foreign lawyer or law firm, 
and to rely on local lawyers in that office when rendering legal services 
involving host-country law; 
extending to foreign lawyers and law firms established in a host country many 
of the rights and privileges (including attorney-client privilege) identified with 
host-country lawyers; and 
requiring such foreign lawyers and finns to observe the professional rules and 
standards applicable to host-country lawyers, thus not only subjecting them to 
host-country professional discipline, but also indicating that they are being 
treated on a par with traditional host-country lawyers. 
"'"""' The prop?~ed ref~rence paper was reportedly made available to Members of the 
vv .tO (to partlClpants m the GATS Doha Round negotiatiOns) . Apparently, however, 
the paper was seen by many WTO Members as being overly ambitious. In any event, it 
Produced little in the way of enthusiasm, that is, of expectations that the Doha Round 
Would generate a substantial number of specific commitments on legal services 
Patterned after the reference paper. In some US jurisdictions, it may have been viewed 
as an intrusion on the prerogatives of state authorities unwilling to adopt a rule 
resembling-indeed, broadening the scope of-the rule regarding advice on host-
~ountry law adopted by New York in 1974. Outside of the United States, it rna~ have 
een VIewed as another manifestation of a policy of"globalization" by an mdustnalized 
---13 33 See Proposed Reference Paper relating to GATS Commitments on Legal Services, The Association of the lJ~ of the City ofNewYork (ABCNY) , Februaty 21,2002 (on file with ABCNY) (offered by the ABCNY to the 
llJ. TR to "be considered as a basis for the United States position on Legal Services" in the Doha Round of 
e Ultiiateral trade negotiations). The ABA urged the USTR in its trade negotiations to seek pennanent 
(>Stab~shments consistent with the ABA's Model Rule. See Report by the Section of International Law and 
ractJce of the American Bar Association to the ABA House of Delegates, February 1, 2002. 
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country seeking to enable its providers of legal services to gam extensive rights of 
establishment in other countries. 
The lack of enthusiasm for the legal-services reference paper just discussed suggests 
that the paradigm of the "foreign legal consultant" is not gathering momentum as a 
means for promoting either regulatory rules favoring cross-border legal practice, or 
robust legal-service commitments under the GATS. The effect seems to be cumulative, 
that is, the weakness of the FLC as a paradigm in one area seems to contribute to its 
weakness in the other. Because local regulators resist according the FLC the right to 
practice local law, trade negotiators may conclude that they are denied the authority to 
make specific commitments to protect that right. This phenomenon may cut two ways 
because, if trade negotiators conclude that they are precluded from promoting croW 
border rights of establishment, trade negotiations may do little to reduce the 
protectionist proclivities of local regulators. 
In summary, the "seamless web" reasoning of the 1993 report supporting the ABA 
Model Rule may have been vitiated by the realities of the circumscribed "foreign legal 
consultant" in many localities, and the ambitions for the legal-services reference paper 
proposed for the Doha Round may have been dashed by a fairly widespread lack of 
enthusiasm for ground-breaking legal-services commitments under the GATS. Thus, the 
GATS negotiations on legal services may be destined for compromise in the form of a 
lowest common denominator, if not retrograde, licensed consultant who, if permitted at 
all, will be excluded from practicing the law of the jurisdiction granting the license to act 
as a consultant. A result that seemingly ratifies the vitiation of the 1993 ABA report on 
legal consultants and that seemingly dashes early Doha Round ambitions for legal services 
leads to the question, can bilateral or regional trade negotiations not under the aegis of the 
WTO make more progress than the Doha Round in the area of legal services? 
C. BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON LEGAL SERVICES 
It is difficult to discern a pattern of progress in the area oflegal services when theY 
are included in bilateral or regional trade negotiations. T he record is spotty as regards 
bilateral trade agreements, and, outside the EU, rather unimpressive as regards regional 
arrangements. 34 
Many bilateral trade agreements are asymmetrical in terms of the relative 
negotiating power of the two parties because, of the two, one party has more 
substantial economic resources than the other.35 In the negotiation of such an 
34 See Sydney M . Cone, III, The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed itt Terms of Most-Favored-Nation Treatmettl 
attd "Imperial Preftrence," 26 Mich. J. lnt'l L. 563 (2005). 
35 See Tom Wright, "Collapse of Global Trade Talks: Regional Deals Move to the Forefront," lnternatior•al 
Herald Tribune at 1 Ouly 26, 2006) (discussing that poor countries are disadvantaged with respect to bilateral and 
regional trade talks because "they have little to offer wealthy countries in return") ; Edward Alden, "Bush is Rjghf 
to Push For H.is Fast-Track Trade Policy," Financial Times at 11 Oan. 31, 2007) (referring to a "hodge-podge o
3 bilateral agreements with small countries"). See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 47 
(Oxford University Press 2002) (explaining generally that most bilateral agreements are between developed and 
developing countries). 
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agreement, the stronger party may be interested in obtaining rights pertammg to 
Investment, intellectual property and services in fields such as finance, transportation 
and telecommunications, in relation to which legal services are, at best, a matter of 
secondary concern. As for the less strong party, it may simply lack any realistic hope of 
Penetrating the legal-services market of the stronger party, and may be concerned 
almost exclusively with. export markets for particular goods and particular extractive 
and agricultural products. While legal services may be covered in the negotiation of this 
type of agreement, the result often seems unlikely to be more rewarding for either party 
than specific commitments on legal services made in multilateral "rounds" such as the 
Doha Round.36 
On occasion, legal services will command special attention in bilateral trade 
relations . Perhaps the leading example occurred in the 1980s when, to accommodate 
~S requests, Japan created a profession of "foreign law lawyer" (gaikokuho-
Jrrnubengoshi), thereby permitting certain foreign lawyers meeting particular 
requirements to establish themselves in Japan, but not to practice Japanese law.37 
Japan and the United States were seeking a diplomatic resolution of so-called " trade 
fnctions" resulting from the high level of Japanese exports of goods to the United 
States, compared with a low level of corresponding US exports to Japan. As a matter 
ofinternalJapanese politics, it seemed feasible for the Japanese government to make a 
concession in the area of legal services, and thus to ease somewhat the diplomatic 
tensions being experienced with the United States. Subsequently, during the 
Uruguay Round, the earlier concessions on legal services took the form of specific 
commitments . 
A comparable situation may involve South Korea, which has high levels of exports 
to .• compared with imports from, the United States and the EU,38 and trade discussions 
With countries constituting its major export markets may lead to concessions by South 
l<.?rea permitting foreign lawyers and law firms to open offices in that country.39 As 
With Japan, these concessions may ultimately take the form of specific commitments 
Under the GATS. 
. As for regional trade agreements, their legal-service provisions tend to be laconic, 
neither forbidding nor encouraging the licensing of foreign legal consultants-a subject 
that may have been covered in the negotiation of a regional trade agreement, but that, 
generally, has not served as a principal focal point except, perhaps, in the notional 
---36 See Sydney M. Cone, lll, supra note 34. 37 
See Trade in Legal Services§ 13.2.4. For a recent development, see supra at note 10. . 
& 38 For example, in 2005, Korea exported 843.779 billion in commodities to the U.S. compared to Imports 
a 0111 t.he U.S. of 827.670 billion. Further, Korea's trade-balance advantage wjth the U.S. has mcreased 
~Proxunately 5% increase since 2002. United States Department of Commerce and the U.S. International Trade 
0 111mission. 
& 39 In fact, "the Korean government has agreed to liberalise its legal services market after extensive lobbying 
N°111 the Law Society and the British government." See Press Release, Law Society of England and Wales (23 
1<. ovember 2006). However, under the draft bill, the British foreign legal consultants will not be able to adVJse on 
Orean law. Jd. 
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reckoning-up of overall bargaining positions and results. Somewhat exceptionally, the 
NAFTA sets out detailed provisions on foreign legal consultants. 40 Even so, as brieflY 
mentioned above, it leaves to the individual licensing jurisdictions of its three parties-
to the Canadian provinces and the Mexican and US states-the decision as to whether 
an FLC from the other two parties will be entitled to advise on host-country law. In 
Canada and Mexico, under the FLC rules of every province and state that has adopted 
such rules, the FLC from a NAFTA party seems to lack authorisation to advise on host~ 
country law. Although (as also mentioned above) the ABA Model Rule would pennit 
the FLC to advise on host-country law, a substantial number of US states with FLC 
rules have departed from the Model Rule and prohibit the FLC from providing such 
advice. Thus, efforts by the ABA to use the NAFT A to promote the Model Rule have 
not proved very fruitful. 
A likely explanation for the second-class treatment of legal services in regional 
trade agreements is that the parties thereto have tended to give priority to economiC 
interests other than legal services-economic interests whose impact on national 
employment and income and on fiscal and monetary policy is deemed to be of 
paramount importance. Another possible explanation is that it takes more than a trade 
agreement to mobilize political institutions to persevere successfully in this area where 
entrenched regulatory authorities and a territorial and protectionist mentality must be 
overcome in order to promote a global approach to cross-border legal practice. 
The leading example of regional success in prom6ting cross-border legal practice is 
the European Union. Strikingly, the EU is more than a free-trade area based on a trade 
agreement. The EU is a group of States that share not only a common customs unjon 
and a conunon market but, most importantly, common political institutions that can 
reach policy decisions and legislate on legal services (among, of course, a great manY 
other subjects).41 Moreover, in the event of disagreement concerning policy or 
legislation or its implementation, the disputants can have resort to a single EU-wide 
court system and, ultimately, the European Court of Justice. The success of the EV 
regarding cross-border legal practice within the EU suggests that common legislative 
and judicial institutions and a common supporting infrastructure may be needed to 
remove barriers to lawyers and law firms seeking to establish themselves in host 
countries and to provide services relating to host-country law when it is relevant to the 
transactions, disputes or other matters being dealt with. To a considerable extent, then. 
the EU has been in a position to realize, and has realized, the ABA's 1993 goal of 
fostering rules pursuant to which cross-border practitioners can provide a "seamless 
web" of legal advice. 
40 See Trade in legal Services § 6.5. 
41 See, e.g., EU Directive 77/249/EEC, which facilitates the effective exercise by lawyers of freedom to 
provide services; EU Directive 98/5/EC, which rncilit.1tes practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent bas1,~ 
in a Member State other than that in which the qualification was obtained. European Union Website, "Europa, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_marketfqualificationsfspecific-sectors_en.htm#lawyers (last accessed zz 
January 2007). 
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Even so, the European Union has fallen short of giving global effect to its rules on 
cross-border legal practice. The primary EU legislation is its Establishment Directive, 
Under which a lawyer or law firm in one EU country can become established in other 
EO countries, and under which the lawyer can enjoy favorable treatment when seeking 
to become a member of another EU country's traditional legal profession. 42 The 
benefits of the Establishment Directive are restricted, however, to nationals of EU 
Member States.43 Thus, a lawyer who is not an EU national or a law firm that is not 
controlled by EU nationals, when established in the EU, is not entitled to the benefits 
of the Establishment Directive-even if the non-EU lawyer has become a member of 
~n EU legal profession. Notwithstanding this shortcoming, the availability of the 
seamless web" approach on an intra-EU basis represents far more of an achievement 
than has been realized elsewhere . 
. Even if the EU's legal-services regime did not discriminate against non-EU 
nationals, this regime would of necessity remain an achievement limited to the EU's 
constituent jurisdictions. At their best, their rare and exceptional best, then, regionally 
negotiated agreements on cross-border legal practice cannot rival the global potential of 
a multilateral agreement. Like bilateral agreements, regional agreements exist in parallel 
With each other and with the GATS. Accordingly, regional and bilateral agreements are 
no substitute for a successful Doha Round were it somehow, to achieve its global 
aspirations. In light of indications that many of thes: aspirations may be out of reach, 
the next part will examine how the resulting dilemma can affect cross-border legal 
services. 
IJ. TRAN CENDING THE DoHA RouND DILEMMA 
. As has been seen, some regulators of the legal profession and parts of the profession 
~tsel~ have at times shown a proclivity for protectionism, and the paradigm of the 
t~:eign _le~, consultant h:~ produced mixed results lacking widespread adh~r~n~~ to 
ongmal seamless web rationale as had been found in the concept of conserl JUndrque 
and · 
bij In the 1993 report underlying the ABA Model Rule. As has . also be~n seen, 
ateral and regwnal trade agreements paralleling the GATS often fail to achieve the 
Potential offered by multilateral agreements, and the GATS itself is dependent on 
specific commitments by WTO Members-commitments that sometimes reflect the 
Protectionism and the mixed results just mentioned. Despite these auguries, however, 
~oss-border legal practice not only exists, it seems to grow globally in a dynamic way. 
di~Parentl~, because this area of trade benefits from certain elements of dyn:musm, 
a~pomtmg trade negotiations do not present an impassable bamer to trade m legal 
setvices. What are these elements of dynamism? This question will be examined below ----Of th 42 Directive 98/5/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 15 Febmal")' 1998! to f.lcilitate practice ob . e professton of lawyer on a pennanent basis in a Member State other than dtat m which qualification was 
tai~~d, OJ L077 (14 March 1988) , at 0036-0047. 
See supra note 7. 
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in terms of (a) trade policy, (b) the positive rules governing legal practice , and, (c) the 
perceived conduct of lawyers and law firms engaged in cross-border activity. 
A. T RADE POLICY AND THE CROSS-BORDER PRACTICE OF LAW 
The practice of law is competitive, and legal practitioners have been known to 
attempt to influence trade policy to their competitive advantage. Here, they have much 
in common with (for example) manufacturers who want trade barriers lowered where 
doing so will promote their exports, and raised where doing so will protect them fro!11 
competition. Legal services are not " traded" , however, in the same fashion as 
manufactured goods. 44 Legal services emanate from professionals who can be rather 
mobile, and who tend to favor locations that provide simultaneous access both to 
clients and to the human and technical resources needed for the efficient practice of 
law. 45 Thus, for legal services, "trade" rights often translate into rights of 
establishment-rights to provide legal services at locations that facilitate dealing with 
clients and that permit the services to be appropriately responsive to the clients' needs. 
The concept of comparative advantage-a classical concept in the economics of 
trade-therefore has a special meaning in the area of legal services. The lawyer or la'W 
firm enjoying comparative advantage is in a position to exploit rights of establishment 
more effectively than other lawyers or firms. This comparative advantage may exist for 
historical, cultural or geographic reasons, or by virtue of an individual or firm's recent 
innovative prowess, or because professional success has brought with it a positive 
reputation that attracts additional professional activity. Whatever the explanation, it lieS 
behind the readiness or reluctance of particular legal practitioners to look to trade policY 
to facilitate their development of rights of establishment. 
Not surprisingly, comparative advantage is unevenly distributed, and there are 
wide differences of attitude by legal practitioners toward the development of rights of 
establishment. As mentioned, history, culture and geography can be important. A cit)' 
with major business, commercial and financial resources in a country enjoying 
prominence and independence is likely to engender legal practitioners who look to 
trade policy to promote their access to rights of establishment elsewhere. In contrast, 
isolation from major resources of this type may lead to a parochial and inward-looking 
approach to trade policy. More complicated is the global trading partner that combines 
the attitudes just mentioned. Thus, in each of the European Union and the United 
States, one can find, in different places, markedly different attitudes toward the use of 
trade policy to promote rights of establishment for legal practitioners. 46 The result 
within each of these large trading partners can be tensions between the institutions 
44 See generally, Laurel Terry, GATS' Applicability to Tra~mratior~al Lawyers attd its Potential Impact or1 Domestic 
R egulation f!! U.S. Lawyers, 34 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 989 (2001); see also Trade in Legal Services, Introduction· 
45 See Trade in Legal Services § 1.3.1. 
46 See generally Trade in Legal Services, Chs. 3,4; Part Ill. 
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;rmulating EU or US trade policy, on the one hand, and the trade policy of individual 
lJ Member States or individual US states, on the other. 
A prominent example of outward-looking trade policy is the United Kingdom, 
~here conscious efforts have been made by private and public bodies alike to develop 
b Ondon as an international legal center, and to enhance the overseas presence ofLondon-
~sed legal practitioners.47 At times, these efforts have been well coordinated as between 
~ e Pertinent domestic organizations and authorities. These efforts have occasionally also 
rawn on connections resulting from UK membership in the EU, from Conunonwealth 
~lauonships, and to a certain extent from the English co111111on law tradition in. the 
lUted States and elsewhere. In addition, the primacy of London law firms m vanous 
ltlarkets has been advanced by encouraging the use of English law to govern contractual 
and other relationships. A co111111on denominator in attaining these goals has been the 
tnterplay of private entrepreneurship and official trade policy in the United Kingdom. 
ct· As mentioned above, however, the EU is a global trading partner comprising 
t~:erse Member States. Not every legal profession in the EU shares the goal of assuring 
b P?macy of London law firms. Enhancing the overseas presence of those firms may 
e dnven more by single-minded UK ambitions than by multilateral, mutually agreed 
~~cepts fo~ the development of legal-services markets that are open to all would-be 
bai participants. In short, the formulation of EU trade policy may here be 
complicated somewhat by the single-mindedness of UK policy. 
· Even so, the success of the London firms at home and abroad provides an 
tnstructive illustration of the competitive dynamics of global legal practice. For present 
hUtposes in considering the Doha Round dile111111a, it is critical to note that this success 
as Provided a vital stimulus mitigating the inertial shortcomings of that dile111111a. The 
:;~d to compete with the London firms has given a fillip to trade policy i~ c~un~ries 
e . er than the Uruted Kingdom. The co-ordination of pnvate and public mstltutlons 
u'Ct~ts in a number of countries, perhaps in conscious or unconscious imitation of the 
t lUted Kingdom, with the result that these countries may seek to harness trade policy 
0 
the ambitions of their own cross-border legal practitioners. One characteristic of 
comparative advantage is that it is not i111111utable, and today's leaders could set an 
edleample that will evoke healthy competition to develop more varieties of competitive 
a va ntage tomorrow. 
tho l'he UK example has not been lost on the United States-or, more accura~~ly, on 
se parts of the United States such as New York City where legal practltloners 
~ti ' '. . . 
_ng on a global scale are based. Predictably, these practitioners often asp1re to 
ltlai.ntain or expand their establishments abroad. From the perspective of the US federal 
~v~rnrnent, however, New York City (for example) is not the United States, and 
djtnbitlons in one city for an outward-looking trade policy can be diluted by the rather 
fferent character oflegal practice in other parts of the country-or even in other parts ----l?ress ~See generally Trade in Legal Services, Ch. 7; see also "UK Lawyers Set to Be Allowed to Work in Korea," "-elease, Law Society of England and Wales (23 November 2006) . 
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of New York State. The formulation of trade policy here becomes somewhat 
complicated, and may involve two features: the first is narrowing the outward-lookin!l 
policy to the point where it can avoid opposition, or even gain support, in manY 
localities; the second is devising an overall trade policy that includes enough diverse 
benefits for enough constituencies to overcome any opposition to an outward-looking 
trade policy in respect of legal services. 
An example of both of these features was US policy toward Japan in respect oflegal 
services, beginning in the 1980s. First, there were law firms in legal centers across the 
United States that were interested in opening offices in Japan-a booming market in 
the 1980s, and one not easily served other than by an establishment in Japan. Second, 
many US industries and service providers, other than legal practitioners, sought changes 
in trade relations with Japan. 48 It was thus politically feasible for the USTR to gain 
support for bilateral negotiations with Japan over legal services and thereby to facilitate 
developments that led to a productive combination of trade policy and 
entrepreneurship. 
The examples just presented-of the UK promotion of London-based law finns, 
and of the USTR engaging in legal services negotiations with Japan-can serve as an 
introduction to the broader thesis that the treatment of legal services in the Doha 
Round can provide a picture of the Doha Round dilemma in microcosm. The essence 
of the argument is that, in both cases, the difference between reaching, and not 
reaching, a satisfactory result turns on the ability of the interested parties to harmonize 
diplomatic and entrepreneurial resources. 
Trade policy on legal services may have conceptual origins, but it is unlikely tO 
emerge on the basis of abstract conceptualization. It invariably is driven by a 
combination of governmental policy-makers and entrepreneurial private practitioners, 
making it susceptible to being shaped and re-shaped over time by political give-and-
take reflecting the economic stakes of groups and entities likely to be affected by, or 
seeking to influence, specific outcomes. Thus, as in countless other areas touched bY 
trade negotiations, the formulation of trade policy is here the shared province of 
diplomats and interested stakeholders. When the diplomats and the stakeholders act in 
harmony, the result can be effective both as an expression of common ambitions and as 
a means of attaining specific goals. 
In an area such as legal services, it would be unusual for the diplomats to substitute 
their judgment for the views (if any) expressed by legal practitioners as to the desired 
direction for trade negotiations to take. Proverbially cautious, the diplomats may seeJc 
to conserve their political capital and to steer clear of any risk of displeasing potent 
constituencies. Accordingly, the effective manifestation of entrepreneurship by legal 
practitioners in the arena of trade negotiations will include more than defining goalS· 
Most importantly, it will also include a careful and prudent analysis of the means for 
achieving those goals, and an effective plan for putting that analysis into action at the 
48 See Trade in Legal Services, Ch. 13. 
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Critical point where trade negotiations and cross-border legal practice intersect. In a 
sense, the legal practitioners must do for themselves what they often do for their clients, 
and think through the related problems of formulating desired goals, devising a feasible 
Way for attaining the goals, and effectively communicating the resulting hoped-for 
Process to all relevant parties, one of which of course here comprises the diplomats. 
This description of the role of entrepreneurial stakeholders in trade negotiations is 
~ot peculiar to the area oflegal services. The requisite entrepreneurial content may vary 
t onsiderably from area to area, but the importance of providing that content is common 
; many areas. For this reason, the area oflegal services can be said to present the Doha 
thio~~d dilemma in microcosm. At the level of macro-economics, a major objective of 
f 
5 
round" is to carry out the Doha Development Agenda, which embodies the goal 
0 
enabling developing countries to receive increased benefits from global trade, 
~eal1Ing, in particular, increased access to the markets of developed countries.49 
hncreased market access does not automatically result from setting an ambitious agenda, 
diowever, and generally has a variety of prerequisites in addition to setting goals for the 
c pl~rnats. Thus, in the context of the Doha Development Agenda, there has been 
d onsiderable commentary on the need for financial and technical assistance from 
WVeloped countries, either directly or by way of the International Monetary Fund, 
Orld Bank institutions, and regional development banks. 50 
The Doha Development Agenda has also attracted a certain amount of 
cornrn 
fa .. e?tary on the entrepreneurial gap between those developing countries that lack 
lll~a~ty with . the intermediation required for moving product_s into markets~ and 
th u_ r 111dustnalized nations With substantial experience m achievmg and mamtammg 
p eir Presence in world markets. The essence of tllis gap is that it is not enough to have 
toducts to sell-that there must also exist the know-how required to gain market 
access for those products. 51 While there is no doubt that reducing or eliminating 
P
conventional trade barriers-such as tariffs, subsidized competition, and anti-dumping 
roceedj . f fu . . d d all Ill ngs-Is o ndamental Importance, the entrepreneurship nee e actu y to 
I ove products into markets may not always follow. As discussed above in respect of 
~gal services, entrepreneurial skills may be required to harmonize cross-border practice 
D th trade negotiations. The analogy in respect of the macro-econonlics of the Doha 
d evelopment Agenda is that entrepreneurial skills may be needed to assure that 
r ~Veloping countries, having been accorded certain trade concessions and, possibly, 
e ated financial and technical assistance actually achieve the market access required to 
~ . ' . 
P substantial benefits from those concessions and the related asSIStance . 
....____ 
49 s 
50 ee Doha Development Agenda, supra note 2. . . 
Stanc See, e.g., Jagdish Bha~ati & Arvind Panagarinya, "World Bank and IMF Show Welcome ReVISIOns to 
lette: t~n DeveloP.mg Countnes and Trade," Financial Times at 10, December 24, 2Dg3;RobPortman, USTR, 
A.pri] 2 Editor, Once-In-a-Generation Opportunity to Improve Global Economy, Fmanc1al T1mes at 12, 6 006. 
51 
See, e.g., Ian Limbach, "Building Bridges Over the Skills Gap," Financial Times at 4, March 29, 2006. 
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~onll11unications is an indication of the tenacity with which local regulators, in 
r~l'lnulating rules for foreign practitioners physically present on the territory of the 
gulators, adhere to a policy of denying or limiting the right offoreign practitioners to 
Practice local I aw. 
int The European Union is something of an exception, but solely for purposes of 
te r~-EU practice by EU nationals; by virtue of EU-wide Directives, the relevant 
D ~tory for EU nationals has to a substantial extent become the entire European 
at ruon. The state regulators of the United States, on the other hand, retain considerable 
Prtachlllent to that country's divisibility along state lines for purposes of authorizing the 
P act~ce of law. Formally authorized multistate practice (called "multijurisdictional" 
,,ractlce) among the US states has made some progress, but it has been limited to the 
tempo " h · · · d n . rary presence in a host state of a lawyer from another state w ose actiVIties o 
s:t !~elude the practice of host-state law. In a number" of states, however, including, 
e rpnsmgly, New York, even this modest relaxation of the formal rules has 
ll.countered resistance. 
res _Other federal nations , notably, Australia and Canada, have removed many fom1al 
Ill tnctions on cross-border practice within their respective nations, but these internal 
is easures do not apply to lawyers from other countries. 52 Elsewhere, the general picture 
that · h h · · · Ill countnes reserve t e practice of their own law in t e1r own terntones to 
as embers of their own traditional local legal professions. Even in exceptional ca es such 
e the United Kingdom, where the formal rules are relatively favorable to the 
0~tabhs~ment of foreign lawyers and firms, the rules are inspired by a national objective 
fo:tta1ning transnational comparative advantage, and are not fashioned to move 
fo ard a multilateral process such as the Doha Round. In summary, at the level of 
cortnai rules governing cross-border legal practice, the territorial approach is likely to 
th ntlnue to weigh against progressive multilateral negotiations, thereby contributing to 
e Doha Round dilemma. 
di! Why does de jure regulation oflegal practice tend to contribute to the Doha Round 
ob~tnnla? A probable answer is that the regulators exist to fulfill local regulatory 
ch~ectives and, while often quite aware of multilateral initiatives, are generally not 
itQ arged with any responsibility for synthesizing local and multilateral policies. More 
Portantly, perhaps, the regulators, lacking a mandate to achieve such a synthesis, may 
-......____ 
.._ s2 F I · o · · 'b" ' It ""ttni . or examp e, 111 ntano, Canada, a person who is not a member of the Ontano ar may, Wit lOU 
a~tho s~IOn of the Society, practice law in Ontario on an occasional basis if, and so long as, the person, (a) .1s 
l>racti l1Zed to practice law in a province o r territory of Canada outside Ontario; ... ".By-Law 33, lnter-provlncl31 
byJaw~e of Law, The Law Society of Upper Canada, available at htrp:ffwww.lsuc.on.cafregulation/a/by-laws/ 
adVice~/ (last accessed January 24, 2007). However, by contrast, "foreign legal consulmnts" may not proVIde legal 
4w So rse!'Vlces based on Ontano law under any ci rcumsmnces. See By-Law 39, Fore1gn Legal Consulmnts, The 
Jat}~a Clety of Upper Canada, available at http://www. lsuc.on.cafregu lation/a/by-lawsfbylaw39/ (last accessed 
<'~~st~ 24, 2007) . In N ew South Wales, Australia, a "registered foreign lawyer may adv1se on the effect of 
e~l>ress] an law if: (a) the giving of advice is necessarily incidental to .the practice of foreign law! and (b) the adVIce IS 
the fo Y based on adVIce gtven on the Australian law by an Australian legal pracononer who IS not an employee .of 
lls""ic~eign lawyer." Legal Profession Act 2004 § 188, N .S.W. Acts, available at http:ffwww.austlii.edu.aufa ufleg.s/ 
nsol_actflpa2004179fs188.html (last accessed January 29, 2007). 
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often lack the tools for doing so. Their traditional mission has been to ensure 
compliance by local professionals with local professional standards, not to foster cross-
border rights of establishment for variously credentialed professionals fro!11 a 
multiplicity of foreign jurisdictions. It is not that regulators could not learn to handle 
practitioners with diverse training and experience; in many cases, regulators have in fact 
done just that. The problem is that, to achieve the synthesis just mentioned and to 
continue to act in a regulatory capacity, regulators need effective means for looking intOf 
the constituent elements of cross-border practice in order to appraise the behav10r 0 
the relevant professionals and to assure their compliance with appropriate standards. 
Another possibility is that intervention by regulators is not deemed necessary to 
the extent that cross-border legal practice takes place by virtue of de facto regulator)' 
tolerance. For example, in respect of multijurisdictional practice in the United States, 
mentioned above, questions can be raised as to the need for novel rules in this area. po 
lawyers not enter and leave host-state jurisdicrions as a matter of course with 
considerable frequency? Are they not deemed capable of observing the essential 
standards of their profession when they act in this way? In the event of professional 
misconduct, do not existing disciplinary authorities, as well as the possibility of ciVll 
litigation, suffice to remedy any wrongdoing? Similarly, it seems possible that lawyers 
and law firn1s established outside their home jurisdictions will be tolerated as long as 
they, as a practical matter, observe proper standards of professional conduct. 
Also, as a practical matter, as between the home jurisdiction and the relevant host 
jurisdiction, effective means for enforcement may in fact often be in place. A foreigl'l 
lawyer or firm in a host jurisdiction can be rather conspicuous when having entered the 
host jurisdiction after complying with regulations relating to (for example) 
immigration, customs and taxation, thus announcing the foreigner's presence to the 
local authorities. Disciplinary action or civil litigation involving the foreigner could take 
place in a home as well as a host jurisdiction, and would be likely to attract attentioJ'I 
throughout the global community-a risk that, by itself, could serve to assure a loW 
occurrence of improper conduct. Aware of these factors and of the legal establishmentS 
on their territories, the local regulators oflegal practice may be content to follow de faciO 
rules of reason, and to assume an attitude of tolerance toward activities that appear both 
to meet essential professional standards and to make a positive contribution to the 
provision of professional services in the host jurisdiction. Such an attitude of watchful 
passivity on the part of the de jure regulators could serve to confer on cross-border legal 
practitioners substantial responsibility for coping with the Doha Round dilemma. 
C. A CTIVITIES OF LEGAL PRACTITIONERS AND THE DOHA ROUND DILEMMA 
As has been seen, neither trade policy nor the de jure regulation oflegal practice is a 
likely source for solving the Doha Round dilemma in the area of cross-border legal 
practice. Trade policy has in effect been shackled to the territorial concepts that define 
the "foreign legal consultant" in many jurisdictions, and the proposed reference paper, 
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designed to further the right of establishment in cross-border practice, has not elicited 
;;:ch enthusiasm. As for de jure regulation, it is inherently a product of local politics. 
e .nexus of trade policy and domestic regulation has therefore failed to provide a 
topitious place for the promotion of cross-border practice, and, cast as the Doha 
ou~d dilemma in microcosm, constitutes the dilemma between pursuing the 
Paradigm of ensuring broad rights of establishment and conceding that, realistically, the 
attainabl . h' . 
e In t Is sphere Will be less than paradigmatic. 
the De facto responsibility for shaping cross-border practice has fallen in great part to 
. practitioners themselves, and they are often adept at discerning and developing their acttvi . 
n ties on the basis of reality and the attainable. They need not be, and frequently are 
saot, resigned to a passive view of reality and the attainable. Indeed, it is misleading to 
y that responsibility "has fallen to" them. They have been known to seize 
respo 'bili' 
a d nsi ty for defining the growth of cross-border practice-in effect, for defining 
n redefining the very reality of their attainable activities. 
c Cross-border legal practice can be viewed as just another, although somewhat 
a 
0
:Plex, form of domestic legal practice, blending the elements of professionalism 
s~ entrepreneurship. Professionalism suggests aptitude for and experience with the 
on VIng of problems. Entrepreneurship suggests the skills and resources needed to take 
P 
new areas of practice and to establish new client relationships. For many racr 0 
of Itioners, then, particularly those practising together in law firms, the challenges 
Pe~ross-border practice resemble the types of challenges with which they are, 
orce, already familiar. 
l\13 Bere, it is useful to revert to the 1993 report that accompanied what became the 
ace A. Model Rule. 53 The report emphasized that legal advice is client-oriented and, 
di Ordingly, is cast not in terms of abstract territorial laws but as a "seamless web" 
rected al . . . h If the . to an yzmg a transactiOnal problem or a dispute or some other matter, as sue .. 
s re Is a demand for a particular type of"searnless web" cross-border legal practice, It 
eellls lik l will . ali to fu . e Y as a matter of basic economics that a corresponding supply maten ze 
th rntsh the legal practice in demand. The goal of a cross-border legal establishment, 
!hen, Is to synthesize the elements required for a useful, client-oriented response to 
.,.ven · . . , 
6 , Situatwns. If vanous types of expertise are relevant, the lawyers (or frequently the 
fllJ. s) t k . . i as IS to marshal the diverse sources and resources that are pertinent, to engage 
i:~~e necessary analysis thereof, and to assemble the results into a usable plan for 
~·.,o.ediate or future action. 
q Thus viewed, the task for the cross-border establishment, confronted with ~~ 0 0 0 f 0 th qu . ns mvolvmg host country law, is to find an efE.c~ent means o answenng ose 
1 estions. Perhaps the answers will have to be obtained from host-country lawyers 
0°ca~ed in the host country-within the establishment itself, where that is permitted, or 
liUtside the establishment, if feasible. These may not be the only possibilities, however. 
Ost-country lawyers may be established cross-border, that is, outside the host country -----53 See supra note 29. 
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itself, but may nonetheless be accessible to the establishment in the host countr)'· 
Indeed, a firm with establishments in several countries may have lawyers from a given 
country in more than one of its establishments, and all of its lawyers may be available 
firm-wide by various means of communication, or may be physically available by rneans 
of intra-firm, inter-establishment visits by the relevant lawyers. As suitable to the 
occasion, such a visit might be brief or extensive in duration, and might be sornewha~ 
fonnal or informal in character. The finn, looking at problems involving the laws 0
1 diverse jurisdictions, could assess them in entrepreneurial as well as purely professiona 
terms, and could organize its practice both to address the legal substance of the 
problems and to serve its clients as effectively as its resources pennit. 
To a significant extent, then, cross-border practice can become a matter of how a 
particular law firm organizes its practice both generally and to cope with individual 
situations. The firm can be expected to develop and manage its professional resources 1n 
order to achieve comparative advantage in competing for legal work involving specific 
areas of practice or specific types of clients. When this phenomenon becornes 
generalized, the picture is one of numerous law firms with transnational interests 
competing with each other in a world in which cross-border practice is commonplac~ 
Spurred by competition, these firms can be expected to overcome the Doha Roun 
dilemma through resourceful and, at times, selective decision-making. Thus, the 
making of judgments detemuning the dimensions and content of cross-border practice 
will have devolved upon competing practitioners, who will be making these judgments 
in the process of organizing their responses to perceived opportunities in varioUS 
markets for legal services. In global terms, the overall result may be an ever-increasing 
volume of cross-border practice. 
While the global volume of cross-border practice may be increasing, access t~ 
this practice is necessarily restricted to firms and practitioners enjoying, or capable 0 
developing, the resources required to participate therein. It can be argued that, tO 
become a viable participant in the race for comparative advantage, a firm must be of a 
certain "critical mass" in the legal market, or a firm or practitioner must be able to fill 
a special professional niche. Even so, these factors hardly distinguish cross-border 
from domestic practice. Wherever the search occurs for comparative advantage, the 
market at any given time is likely to favor the established over the unknown 
reputation. 
In contrast to a purely domestic market, however, in the transnational market one 
encounters the controversy over "globalization". It arises from the claim that having a 
base in a recognized center of international legal practice confers a competitive 
advantage in the race for comparative advantage, and that the number of such centers 15 
both limited and skewed in favor of industrialized, as contrasted with developing• 
countries. The argument against "globalization" is that practitioners and firms froJ'll 
developed centers of international practice have an advantage in the world's markets for 
legal services; and that a market-based response to the Doha Round dilemma concal05 
elements of competitive unfairness, tending to confer rights of establishment on a pre' 
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~elected categ01y of legal practitioners. 54 The counter-arguments are essentially two. 
~rst, the alternatives to allegedly unfair markets may be territorial rules that are 
t emselves arbitrary and protectionist. Second, markets have a tendency to evolve over 
hme on the basis of real-life judgments as to the quality of the legal services being 
offered, thus permitting today's perceived unfairness to be offset as markets become 
more open to wider participation by new beneficiaries of comparative advantage. 
III c 
. ONCLUSION 
a . In the microcosm of legal services, the Doha Round dilemma might not have 
nsen If a broad spectrum of countries had indicated a willingness to make specific 
c~lllmitments based on the proposed reference paper for legal services. In so doing, 
t. ese countries would have effectively adopted common rules to govern cross-border 
l1ghts of establishment. In the event, however, the proposed reference paper remained a 
lllere proposal and did not achieve fonnal adoption. 
Even so, in actuality, the de facto market-based approach may have accomplished 
~~ch that ~as sought in the proposed reference paper for legal services. 
twithstanding the absence of widespread multilateral agreement on wntten rules, 
~arket participants seem to have provided a viable means for facilitating and developing 
t~nsnational activity. Thus, the Doha Round dilemma may have been resolved in 
111icrocosm. 
fi In view of the foregoing, the proposed legal-services reference paper and the de 
iacto lllarket-based approach have much in common. Both are rooted in the ability of an 
1ldividual practitioner or law firm to conduct a legal practice from establishments in 
lllore than one jurisdiction. The reference paper would formally create cross-border 
l1ghts of establishment to facilitate this type of practice. The market provides an 
0
derative context where this type of practice in fact takes place. Obviously, there are 
:ft:antages t~ rights s.temming from an agreed written text, as contrasted with the 
n-unpredictable giVe-and-take of the marketplace. Among other tlungs , GATS 
colllmitments would provide for the resolution of disputes under existing WTO 
~tocedures. Moreover, from their perspective, the providers oflegal services might find 
It co~c . h " . .d I . d ••uortmg to ave safe harbors" of agreed comnutments to gw e t 1e1r con uct . 
. Less obviously, the flexibility of the market may have advantages over formal 
"-'ntte · · · · t n comnutments set out m an agreed reference paper. Over rnne, comnutmen s 
lllay prove to be in less than complete harmony with currently accepted standards for 
Protecting and serving the interests of transnational clients, and may become 
~~sponsive to the dynamic conduct of legal practice. Given satisfactory observance 
th gh standards of professionalism as well as work-product of reliable and good quality, 
e Users as well as the providers oflegal services may be best served by the judgiTients of ---Cioba:: s,ee, e.g., articles posted on http://www.prospect.org/issue_pages/globalization/ esp. joseph E. Stiglitz, 111 s Drscontents. See also Center for Research on Globalization: http://www.globalresearch.ca/. 
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the market. Efforts to fashion commitments to correct the perceived imperfections of 
the market may or may not prove beneficial. From the perspective of assuring the 
provision of responsive, reliable and reasonably priced legal work, market-dictated levels 
and modes of professional activity may offer advantages difficult to achieve otherwise. 
From the point of view, however, of critics of "globalization", the advantages of 
the market may seem to carry unacceptable disadvantages in the form of undue benefits 
accruing to firms and practitioners from industrialized countries. Therefore, in the end. 
it may be worthwhile to try to fashion a document-be it a reference paper for GArs 
commitments or an annex to the GATS-that will satisfy the many interests at stake ill 
organizing a multilateral approach to trade in legal services. Obviously, such a 
document would reflect a number of negotiated compromises. 
Among the points of view to be taken into account are those of the regulators of 
the world's legal professions. For this reason, the existing proposed reference paper 
includes provisons under which a cross-border establishment is subjected both to the 
professional rules of the host jurisdiction and to that jurisdiction's authoritieS 
responsible for enforcing those rules . Perhaps, in a future proposal, this feature might 
be supplemented by provisions under which the authorities in all relevant jurisdictions 
would share information and cooperate as appropriate-provisions of a type that are 
found in other areas of international concern involving national supervisory bodies. 
Another possibility for shaping a future proposal would be to adopt an approach 
used in certain WTO agreements to accommodate the perceived need to provide 
periods during which a category of countries can adjust to certain requirements. Thus, a 
future reference paper might become effective immediately for many countries, but, iJl 
certain respects, might be phased in over an agreed period of time for other countrieS· 
The purpose of the phasing-in would be to ease adjustment to those provisions that are 
thought to lead too quickly to particular features of "globalization". 
In conclusion, it is not only possible for a nexus to exist, a nexus does e:JCist, 
between trade policy and cross-border legal practice. The nexus having been identified, 
the challenge is to assure its growing good health and development to the mutual 
benefit of both areas of international activity. Trade policy can benefit when, even iJl 
microcosm, a viable process is forged for solving the Doha Round dilemma. As for 
cross-border practice, it stands to become yet more vigorous over time as it both 
contributes and responds to policies supportive of multilateral trade. 
